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Abstract 
Purpose of this paper  
A ‘development competition’ is a sale by tender of publicly-owned land with development potential 
where bidders also submit designs. This research investigated development competitions in 
England in order to uncover any shortcomings and point to improvements. 
Design methodology approach 
First, an interview survey of local authorities in north-east England; second an interview survey 
with developers in north–east England; third a questionnaire survey of local authority estates 
officers and fourth an interview survey with London based property consultants. 
Findings 
Despite their theoretical attractions, some competitions have problems.  Conflict exists between 
professions and agencies. Development competitions encounter difficulties between developer 
appointment and construction which may lead to delay or the developer pulling out. 
Research limitations 
The data collected is biased in favour of the financial / property perspective. Further research is 
therefore still required. 
Practical implications 
Large numbers of competitions are held in the UK each year.  The disposal of sites in this way has 
become more significant due to the concentration of activity on brown-field land.  In future, the 
need to assemble urban land using compulsory purchase powers is likely to make competitions 
more frequent. These results, which highlight best practice, will be of interest to all professional 
people involved. 
What is original/ value of paper 
Despite its practical significance, no literature exists on this specific topic. The results reveal 
delays, disputes and sub-optimal use resources. Further research is needed leading to new official 
guidance covering all aspects of this process. 
Introduction 
Public authorities in Englandi hold large numbers of surplus sites and buildings, with development 
potential, which they wish to sell.  The aim of the sale will be either to raise funds and / or to further 
other aims, such as urban regeneration.  A ‘development competition’ii is a method of site 
marketing and disposal that seeks to achieve a balanced combination of these ends.  The financial 
aim will normally be associated with matters such as ‘deliverability’, price and ‘overage’.  The non-
financial aims include, for example, ‘affordable’ housing, sustainable development, land-use mix 
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and high quality design.  This paper reports on a research project that combined quantitative and 
qualitative methodologies.  In spring 2004 a case study of the use of development competitions in 
Tyne and Wear, UK was carried out.  Semi structured interviews were conducted with relevant 
officers from all five Local Authorities and with thirteen property development companies with 
recent experience of competitions (Todd 2004).  In the spring of 2004, a postal survey was carried 
out of UK Local Authority Estates Officers covering their use, experience and views on 
development competitions.  Questionnaires were sent to a sample of 225 Local Authorities, 
focussing on the largest and most urban.  90 replies were received, at a response rate of 40%.  
Finally in the spring of 2005, semi-structured interviews were held with leading practitioners in ten 
London based international property consultancies which specialise in advising both public 
authority vendors and property developers. Both sets of interviews were recorded and, following 
transcription, the results were coded into major and minor themes without the use of specialist 
software. This paper begins with a review of the regulations governing the sale of development 
land by public authorities in England. The concept of a ‘development competition’ is then 
introduced and contrasted with other methods of disposal. The typical procedure for a competition 
is then discussed from start to finish and associated issues and problems are examined. The 
strengths, weaknesses and future of competitions are then analysed before a conclusion. 
Sales of development land by public authorities 
Central Government and Government Agencies 
Surplus land and property is sold by a wide variety of central government departments, public 
agencies and bodies.  These include the National Health Service, Network Rail, Defence Estates, 
British Waterways, Colleges and Universities.  These bodies sell land with the primary aim of 
raising capital to reinvest in their service or operation.  For this reason, while other matters may be 
taken into consideration, price is normally at the top of their agenda.  This may be balanced by a 
requirement to procure the right to occupy accommodation in the redeveloped property.  Under the 
Government Accounting Rules, public authorities are required to sell for the “best consideration 
reasonably obtainable” which is made up of: -  
1. ‘market value’, as defined by the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors (RICS 2003a); 
plus  
2. ‘special value’, which is extra value above market value deriving from an adjoining owner or 
other potential purchaser with a special interest; plus 
3. the value of any voluntary conditions entered into by the vendor authority, so far as they 
can be quantified in monetary terms (HM Treasury 2005). 
 
Government departments and agencies are encouraged to register surplus sites on the Register of 
Surplus Public Sector Land, which is maintained by English Partnerships (EP)iii.  Once registered, 
other public agencies often EP itself have a 40 day right to purchase the land at market value. The 
Register is intended to ensure that wider Government objectives, including housing needs and 
regional economic and housing strategies are factored into land disposal decisions (English 
Partnerships 2005a). The most well known recent case of a transfer involved 100 sites covering 
1,650 hectares, which were to have been the subject of a public-private partnership between NHS 
Estates and Miller Homes.  In April 2004 these sites were transferred to the ODPM and EP (ODPM 
2004).  EP is different to many other agencies since its aim in selling development land is almost 
always to secure regeneration benefits as well as the best price.  EP has been given a brief 
covering promoting affordable housing, prefabricated construction and sustainable development.  
Having acquired the NHS sites at market value, EP announced its Hospital Sites Programme 
involving increased numbers of affordable homes likely to reduce re-sale values (English 
Partnerships 2005b). 
 
The Regional Development Agenciesiv operate in a similar way but are more concerned to reach 
employment and land reclamation targets.  Both EP and the RDAs work with Local Authorities in 
the joint disposal of sites where, for example, they provide further land or infrastructure funding.  
Agencies working in partnership may have different priorities, concerning, for example, the 
promotion of affordable housing and tensions can arise. This should be anticipated and a 
‘stakeholder agreement’ should be drawn up at the outset. 
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Local Government 
Unlike most government bodies, a local authority has an ongoing interest in the regeneration of the 
site and its impact on the wider environment. Under the Local Government Act 2000, an authority 
has a duty to promote the economic, social and environmental well being of its area.  Under the 
Local Government Act 1972: General Disposal Consent (England) 2003, a Local Authority may 
dispose of land where: -  
1. the sale is likely to promote or improve the economic, social or environmental well being of 
its area, or persons resident in its area; and  
2. the difference between the ‘unrestricted value’ of the land and the consideration proposed 
for the disposal does not exceed £2 million (ODPM 2003a). 
 
The technical appendix to the Consent reflects the Treasury rules and the RICS ‘Red Book’ (HM 
Treasury 2005, ODPM 2003b, RICS 2003a).  The ‘unrestricted value’ of the land is the ‘market 
value’ of the land (RICS 2003b) plus any additional amount reasonably expected from a special 
purchaser but ignoring the affect of any condition(s) voluntarily entered into by the vendor.  In a 
sale by tender, this will normally be the highest offer made.  The ‘restricted value’ takes into 
account the capital value of any voluntary condition(s) that can be assessed in monetary terms; 
this will normally be the amount offered by the proposed transferee (RICS 2003a).  Where the 
difference or ‘undervalue’ is greater than £2 million the authority must seek prior consent for the 
disposal from the Department for Communities and Local Government.  There is often a difference 
of aim between a Local Authority’s treasury, estates and planning functions.  The decision may be 
influenced by the size of the anticipated sale price and the authority’s need for capital receipts.  
Proposed decisions must be reported to the appropriate Committee(s) of the Authority for official 
approval by the council members. 
European Union public procurement rules 
The European procurement rules apply to contracts for works of a value greater than E5.2m let by 
public authorities. These procedures break down barriers to trade, ensure a fair and transparent 
process and give legal rights to an aggrieved bidder. The authority must prepare detailed 
documents in advance, setting out the nature of the process and contract, including bid evaluation 
criteria. The invitation to tender must be advertised in the Official Journal of the European Union 
(OJEU). There may be a short-listing stage involving a pre-qualification questionnaire. Bids must 
be scored against the stated criteria and feedback given to bidders (OGC 2005). The Public 
Contracts Regulations (2006) implement the EU rules in England. Although land transactions are 
excluded from these regulations, there can be circumstances in which they apply, for example 
where the authority intends to occupy part of the premises created. If there is doubt, a legal opinion 
should be sought to avoid a potential challenge and consequent waste of time and resources 
(Drivers Jonas 2005). Some Authorities choose to follow the rules in every case. 
Sales by private treaty 
Public bodies are able to sell development land and property by private treatyv if they feel that that 
will provide the best consideration.  Case law suggests that competition is not always necessary 
(Drivers Jonas 2005).  The most usual type of off-market sale is to a ‘special purchaser’.  Where a 
landowner, of part of the site or of adjoining land, has the intention to develop, then its bid is likely 
to be greater than any other.  Here the best consideration would probably not be achieved by an 
open market sale.  The public authority would have to be convinced that the purchaser could 
deliver the sale and the redevelopment.  In addition, there could be a case of a special type of 
property with a limited market or a site of marginal viability where there are likely to be only two or 
three realistic bidders.  Since open market bidding for development land provides intense 
competition and public scrutiny, some developers prefer to buy sites privately whenever they can. 
Where such a developer indicates that it would not bid publicly, the possibility of a private sale 
should be considered. Before selling land by private treaty, the authority should take both legal and 
valuation advice to demonstrate that the best consideration is likely to be achieved. 
Sales by formal tender 
In a sale by formal tendervi the developer is committed by the bid to exchanging contracts and 
paying the deposit.  It is possible for a public body to sell in this way, but this would only be 
advisable if its overriding aim were speed of sale and certainty of capital receipt by a set date.  For 
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example, a university might need to raise capital urgently for a relocation project and might not be 
much concerned with the redevelopment fate of the site.  Due to the complexity of development, 
few developers like buying sites in this way.  A formal tender is binding like at auction but does not 
have the benefit from the bidder’s viewpoint of public bidding.  The winning bidder may have bid 
substantially higher than the next highest offer and be unaware of it.  This is sometimes known as 
the ‘winner’s curse’. 
Sales by informal tender  
The term ‘informal tender’ used by estate agents is identical legally to a sale by private treaty by 
negotiation, since neither vendor nor bidder is bound by the offer and acceptance of the bid.  The 
purpose of such a tender is for the vendor to select a party with whom to negotiate a sale by 
private treaty.  For public authorities the informal tender may have some of the trappings of a 
formal tender such as set dates, sealed bids and scrutinisers.  While such rules help to 
demonstrate even-handedness and public accountability, they do not bind either party.  The 
advantage of the informal tender is that, in complex development situations, it allows room for 
further detailed pre-contract negotiation.  Interviewees agreed that the vast majority of sales of 
development land by the public sector are by informal tender. 
Definition of a development competition 
The term ‘development competition’ is not widely used or officially defined.  To help to produce a 
clear definition, a table was drawn up that compares sales by private treaty, by tender and by 
development competition (Table 1.). 
 
Table 1: Defining a Development Competition 
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Sale by informal tender never normally always
Development, refurbishment or conversion potential sometimes sometimes always
Procurement of public facilities sometimes sometimes sometimes
Evidence of accounts / finance submitted by bidders sometimes sometimes always
Details of professional team submitted by bidders sometimes sometimes always
Short listing procedure never sometimes normally
Supporting information issued sometimes sometimes always
Planning brief issued sometimes sometimes normally
Design proposals submitted by bidders never never always
Price submitted without 'overage' and / or 'clawback' sometimes sometimes sometimes
Price submitted with 'overage' and / or 'clawback' sometimes sometimes normally
Development agreement sometimes sometimes normally
Planning application follows sometimes sometimes always  
 
From this analysis the following definition of a development competitionvii was drafted and used in 
the research: - 
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A sale or other disposal of land, with or without buildings, with development potential.  The vendor 
is a Local Authority, Development Agency, Government Agency or similar public body.  The sale is 
by informal tender though, in addition to price, bidders are required to submit other matters such as 
design proposals, financial support or track record.  Bidders may be issued with a Development 
Brief and/ or supporting information but the competition is not part of a formal planning application. 
 
The consultant interviewees all confirmed that this definition accurately reflected current practice.  
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Early in the process 
A vendor has much discretion over how to set up and manage a competition; however a typical 
process composed of 8 stages is illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1.  The Development Competition Process (Local Authority vendor) 
                           Developer Input   Local Authority Input 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source Todd (2004) 
 
 
Stage 8
LA requests an expressions of interest 
from developers
LA will produce marketing information and a 
development brief and seek interested parties.
Developer will need to assemble a team. - Architects, agents, 
builders, QS, M&E, landscape gardeners etc 
to produce a detailed scheme. 
Developers detailed submission is forwarded to LA to  include 
a financial and design bid.  
LA will select preferred developer (Winner).
Short listed developers may be invited for interview 
or requested to carry out a  presentation to show ideas.
Developer may appoint an architect / agent for advice
Stage 1
Stage 3
Stage 4
Stage 5
Stage 6
Stage 7
LA may shortlist developers
LA will request from developers a detailed  
submission to include a financial bid plus a 
design of the proposed scheme.
Property services will review design and financial 
bids, planning will ensure compliance with the 
development brief.
Developers bid is re-submitted   LA may revert back to any of the developers to 
advise of possible amendments to be made to their 
submissions.
Stage 2
LA will identify land for disposal via development 
competition.
Expression of 
Interest
Short listing
Submission of detailed bid
Identification of Land for disposal
Presenting the scheme
Selection
Post Selection
Marketing development land.
Short listed developers and their teams may be invited for interview 
or requested to carry out a presentation to explain their scheme further.
Developers will express initial interest advising 
who they are, what they do, and what their approach 
would be to their proposed development.  They 
need to show ability and willingness to do the scheme 
on the terms and conditions that the LA impose. 
LA may shortlist 
developers
LA may shortlist developers
Developer seek and obtain planning application
Building Agreement is drawn 
up documenting the 
particulars of the sale.
Developer accesses the site and 
commences the development process.  
FH or LLH is transferred to developer 
on completion.
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Preparation and documentation 
At the outset the public authority must ensure that it has enough time and resource to devote to the 
process.  Small or low value sites should probably be disposed of in another way.  A priority for the 
disposing authority should be to establish a business case with clear objectives and priorities with 
which all the stakeholders agree.  Where two authorities are cooperating on a project then they 
may need to enter into a formal legal agreement.  It is important to ensure that decision-makers, 
especially political members, are aware of and endorse the clear aims from the outset so that they 
do not change them later on.  The project manager must ensure that all relevant parties have 
agreed their roles and responsibilities at the outset.  It is important to prepare well in advance, 
since the quantity and quality of bids received depends in part on the quality of the documents 
prepared.  Public land and buildings to be disposed of must be valued in advance by a 
professionally qualified valuer (HM Treasury 2005 S24.2.4).  This should help the sale to be set up 
so that the proposed development is commercially viable.  National Heath Service Trusts have 
been advised to ask for a range of valuations based on reasonable assumptions about uses and 
markets (Comptroller and Auditor General 2002).  The legal title should be clarified before 
proceeding with the sale to give bidders a secure basis and to avoid possible delays and possible 
excuses for a bidder pulling out once appointed. 
 
A Development Brief should be drawn up that incorporates a Planning Brief, Supporting 
Information and an Invitation to Tender.  The full brief may not be issued until a short list has been 
drawn up.  Guidance has been issued on how to draw up a master plan (CABE 2004) and a site-
specific planning brief (ODPM 1998).  A good brief will make clear the authority’s objectives while 
allowing bidders sufficient flexibility to make a creative contribution.  The Invitation to Tender 
should set out the whole process from expressions of interest to short-listing, evaluation and 
selection, including a firm and realistic timetable for each stage.  The Supporting Information 
should include matters that will be included in an eventual Development Agreement.  The list of 
such matters is lengthy but includes for example, licence to occupy, rights of access and site 
security. The Invitation to Tender must make clear what form the submission should take.  
Developer interviewees said that they were not normally made aware of the evaluation criteria.  
Some consultant interviewees felt that issuing the criteria and /or weightings was good transparent 
practice that created trust; others felt that pragmatic or optimum decisions are constrained by 
public criteria that can never anticipate the range of actual bids. 
Attracting bidders 
Some developers will not compete under any circumstances.  Other developers will be attracted by 
the commercial opportunity that the site offers which may be weighed against the bureaucracy that 
the competition involves.  Developers are naturally concerned that they will face high abortive 
costs if they are not successful.  However, the more attractive the site is the more risk they are 
prepared to take.  Larger developers will be more able to pass some of these business overheads 
on to their professional advisers.  The vendor will look for a financially strong developer who will be 
able to bear such costs.  Some developers will be willing to pay the reasonable cost of an 
authority’s professional advisers, if they expect that this will lead to a smoother process.  Some 
developers, particularly in the residential sector, may be put off by a scheme that is too complex.  
Developer interviewees said that they would react negatively to an over-prescriptive brief where 
the firm ‘who could write the biggest cheque’ would be selected.  They said that they preferred a 
flexible brief leaving room for creativity.  In the commercial sector some developers will engage 
with a complex scheme, feeling that less competition may lead to greater profitability.  Developers 
like to see a degree of exclusivity and would not wish to see the authority actively promoting 
another site competing in the same market.  The authority’s aims for the non-price aspects of the 
competition must be realistic.  The greater the viability of the scheme, the more developers will 
tolerate non-commercial aspects.  Few developers will bid where they see too many demands 
made by the vendor on a low value site. 
Expressions of interest and short listing 
In the first instance it is normal practice to ask bidders for an expression of interest.  At this stage a 
limited amount of information is released to the market.  Bidders are normally asked to provide 
their report and accounts with details of their track record and professional advisers.  On this basis 
and on the number of expressions received, some bidders may be rejected.  A number of bidders 
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are invited to an interview after which a short list is drawn up.  The interview may be conducted by 
consultants and/ or officers or there may be involvement of political members at that stage.  The 
developer needs to convey competence but also enthusiasm for the project.  The authority needs 
to feel comfortable about working with the developer. The short-list must short enough to provide 
bidders with a realistic chance of success yet long enough to generate real competition. When 
respondents were asked to indicate a minimum and maximum number, the median scores were 2 
and 6 respectively. However, interviewees felt that with a short-list of 3 or less, there is a danger of 
insufficient competition if one bidder drops out.  Similarly with a short-list of 6, some developers will 
feel that the odds are too long.  While circumstances vary, a short list should probably contain 4 or 
5 bidders, with 1 reserve.  
Final offers 
Once the short list has been drawn up, the remaining bidders are issued with the full 
documentation for the sale.  Final bids include, a financial offer in the prescribed format(s); a fully 
detailed development appraisal(s); confirmation of funding and the development proposal (layout, 
plans, elevations, sections, specification). Where these have not been submitted previously, details 
of the professional team and the track record of the company are also included. 
The financial offer 
The basis of the bids required should be made clear in the brief.  Sometimes there may be a 
requirement for bids to be made on more than one basis.  The bid to purchase the site may be a 
straight capital sum to purchase the freehold interest.  If a long lease is to be disposed of there will 
be a rental bid or a combination of rent and capital premium and the rent review provisions need to 
be set out. 
‘Overage’ 
While there is no official definition of an ‘overage’ provision, it is normally taken to mean an extra 
sum payable due to increases in the market value of the property.  Such payments are very 
common with residential land sales.  Many public authorities include such provisions for fear of 
criticism that the price paid did not reflect the uplift in the market during the development period, 
particularly with large schemes.  The development agreement therefore needs to contain a formula 
based on an open book that allows the uplift to be simply calculated.  Developers will normally 
want an overage payment to be reduced by reference to any escalation in construction costs.  The 
clause may involve more than one threshold with different rates of payment.  The overage 
provisions may be split into different land uses, with affordable housing normally being exempt. 
‘Clawback’ 
This is an additional payment conditional upon the grant of a planning permission more 
advantageous than that originally envisaged in the submitted designviii. The development control 
decision should accord with the Planning Brief though the competition must be seen to be separate 
from the statutory planning function.  Developers will try and sometimes succeed in increasing 
storey heights or density or altering the land use mix. The Development Agreement will refer to an 
approved design and permission for deviation from that will be required, subject to an extra 
payment.  In the case of a sale of land at the Royal Brompton Hospital, London the National Audit 
Office found that, if a ‘clawback’ clause had been included in the sale, the NHS would have 
received an extra £6.5 million (NAO 1999). 
Fixed price? 
There are a few cases where an authority has offered land at a fixed price, possibly below market 
value, and then challenged developers to compete on design alone.  The advantage of this 
approach is that it frees developers to produce the best scheme they possibly can.  A danger from 
the authority’s point of view is that it could result in bad publicity if a developer, who was not 
selected, claimed that it could have offered a higher price but was prevented from doing so.  
‘Clawback’ and ‘overage’ are still applicable even though the initial price is fixed.   
Evaluation 
Development competitions are not new in practice, having been in use since at least the late 
1960six. Likewise, the literature on planning evaluation is lengthy (Stocks et al 1971). Selection of a 
preferred bidder may be in a number of rounds depending on the priorities of the authority.  A first 
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round may involve the financial bid alone followed by the consideration of a limited number of 
designs.  Alternatively the first round may be on design only after which a limited number of sealed 
bids are opened.  The evaluation may be managed in the form of a matrix where all the decision 
criteria are scored and weighted.  The matrix should always be bespoke for the particular project 
and agreed in advance.  In the most complex situations there may be up to three rounds with the 
criteria weighted differently at each stage.  The criteria should be made available to the bidders.  
Whether bidders should be told the weights is a matter of judgment.  When judging the criteria, 
decisions can be either ‘yes/ no’ or marks can be awarded.  Scoring of financial matters can be 
relatively objective.  Where criteria are expressed quantitatively, for example land uses as 
percentages of total floorspace, scoring can also be objective.  Inevitably some criteria, for 
example design, are subjective and need to be scored carefully, possibly by a panel.  However, 
care should be taken to avoid the criteria turning into a straight jacket, since one of the reasons for 
a competition is to promote creativity.  Each developer has its own ideas, products and partners 
and a scoring system that appears too restrictive can reduce the number of bidders.  Clearly the 
person(s) responsible for judging each of the criteria needs to be established at the outset.  
Developer interviewers felt that there were often too many decision-makers, which led to delays.  
The operation of the process and the reasons for all judgements made must be fully recorded for 
audit purposes. 
 
Since a competition is an informal tender process, the authority may ask for a final round of bids 
from say two bidders, which may be on price alone.  Alternatively it could ask the highest bidder to 
alter its design somewhat.  Vendors need to be wary of a financial bid that is very much above the 
tone of other bids.  This may be due to unrealistic assumptions.  For this reason bidders should be 
required to submit their appraisals and assumptions, which should be examined in detail by the 
professional team.  The highest price may not be realistic, possibly due to over optimism or 
perhaps because the developer plans to negotiate it down after selection.  As well as price and 
design the matrix should take account of the bidders’ ability to finance and with its professional 
team to deliver the project.  For example where the project involves compulsory purchase, has the 
developer or its team any experience of working with an authority through that process?  Given 
that neither the design nor the price is absolutely fixed at this stage, the selection process needs to 
focus upon getting the right partner that the authority is comfortable working with.  
Variations on the process 
It is possible to hold a design competition first in order to appoint an architect with whom the 
successful developer is expected to work.  Another variation is that the authority sets out its aims 
and developers are asked to prepare broad-brush design solutions first together with track record 
etc.  The authority and its advisers then prepare a detailed brief incorporating the best design 
ideas.  The final stage of the competition is about delivering a tight brief and the most important 
evaluation criterion is price. 
Post decision stages of the process 
The selection of a preferred developer is not legally binding on either party.  There should therefore 
be a timetable to move as swiftly as practical to a legal agreement.  This process concentrates the 
mind on the detail of all aspects of the development and inevitably leads to some disagreement.  
With a simple disposal, the contract for sale can be made conditional on planning permission.  
However, where the vendor has opted for a ‘development competition’ it is likely that it will seek a 
greater degree of control over the whole process.  A Local Authority vendor may also be the Local 
Planning Authority but it may still wish to have a greater degree of control over the development 
outcome.   
The Development Agreement 
Greater control for the vendor is normally achieved through a ‘development agreement’ precedent 
to either a freehold sale or the grant of a long lease.  An advantage for the developer is that it does 
not have to finance the site purchase though this should, in theory, be fed via competition into the 
financial bid.  Development agreements are complex documents, whose clauses typically include: -  
• Prices, including premiums and rents; 
• Price related matters such as ‘overage’ and ‘clawback’; 
• Design and specification; 
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• Responsibilities of the parties; 
• Licence to occupy the site; 
• Timetable with milestones; 
• Warranties; 
• Insurance; and 
• Satisfactory completion of the works 
 
Agreements must be bespoke documents, negotiated and drafted with the specific site conditions 
and parties in mind.  A deposit is paid on signature, and the developer is then able to raise bridging 
finance, if required. 
Problems relating to planning 
Developers being motivated by profit will often apply for planning permission for a development of 
greater value that the design included in the bid.  Developers may often cite new planning 
guidancex in support of their application.  This should be foreseen and the Development 
Agreement should be linked to the approved plans and specifications.  The Local Authority may be 
the vendor but the statutory planning decision must be seen to be separate from the sale of land. It 
is also important to distinguish between a commitment entered into by a developer as part of a 
‘development competition’ when purchasing land, and a ‘planning obligation’xi. It may be that a 
different officer(s) will be involved at this stage; there can be local objections and perhaps greater 
than expected requirements for contributions to highways, schools or affordable housing.  A wise 
developer will consult with all the relevant officers throughout the process.  When respondents 
were asked, “In the last three years in your authority, was there a problem relating to planning 
permission or a planning agreement following a competition”, 72% replied ‘sometimes’ or ‘often’ 
(Figure 2.).  It would appear, therefore, that holding a development competition does not make the 
planning application process run more smoothly. 
 
Figure 2: In your authority over the past three years, was there a problem relating to 
planning permission or a planning agreement following a competition? 
 
 
Once
4%
Never
18%
Don't know
6%
Sometimes
64%
Often
8%
 
 
Problems relating to price 
It is very common for developers to attempt to renegotiate the price or the price formula after 
selection.  Developers like to negotiate and are aware that they are not committed legally.  
Occasionally a developer may have bid unrealistically high and suffer from ‘winner’s curse’.  In 
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some development companies, the top managers may only consider the project seriously after 
being selected.  In other cases there may be genuine market or funding changes that render the 
original bid unprofitable.  For example, another local competing scheme may be announced, a pre-
letting may fall through or a registered social landlord partner may not be able to secure Housing 
Corporation funds.  Respondents to the survey were asked, “In your Authority over the last 3 years, 
did a preferred developer seek to renegotiate the terms of the sale?”  68% of respondents replied 
‘sometimes’ or ‘often’ (Figure 3.).  The vendor may also seek to renegotiate the terms of the 
agreement.  This could be due to a political change in the composition of the Council, a change of 
Government policy, the withdrawal of funding or a land assembly problem. 
 
Figure 3: In your authority over the past three years, did a preferred bidder seek to 
renegotiate the terms of sale? 
Once 
4%
Never
18%
Don't Know 
10%
Often 
14%
Sometimes
54%
 
 
Problems relating to the site 
The selected bidder may not have commissioned full geo-technical and environmental surveys at 
the time of the bid.  The results of these surveys may prompt a redesign, a price negotiation or 
both.  If the vendor had provided surveys with the documentation it will be in a stronger negotiating 
position.  The vendor should have investigated the title in advance, but the formal legal process 
can throw up unforeseen issues.  The discovery of archaeological remains may not have been 
expected and this can cause delay, which may affect viability. 
Withdrawal of a ‘preferred developer’ 
When asked the question “In your authority over the past three years, did a preferred developer 
withdraw following a competition?” over half of respondents to the survey indicated that this had 
occurred (Figure 4.).  The developer may also face changes unconnected with the specific site, for 
example, a change of corporate plan, merger or takeover.  This may lead the developer to wish to 
withdraw from project; it may do so or it may seek a pretext or excuse for withdrawal. 
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Figure 4: In your authority over the past three years, did a preferred developer withdraw 
following a competition? 
Once
8%
Never
32%
Don’t know 
14%
Often
0%
Sometimes
46%
 
 
 
Termination of ‘preferred developer’ status 
The vendor authority should anticipate likely problems and plan its reactions.  Negotiations need to 
proceed at a good pace and any problems need to be resolved along the way.  Where too much 
time has elapsed and/ or the relationship with the preferred developer has soured, a clear warning 
should be given that the preferred status is in jeopardy.  At this stage the vendor needs to be clear 
whether it intends to negotiate with an ‘under-bidder’, though there is no guarantee that the 
‘reserve’ will still be keen.  If too much time has passed, circumstances will have altered and the 
justification for approaching a ‘reserve’ will be weakened to the point that the competition has to be 
run again.  This will clearly cause much delay and negative publicity.  In the Royal Brompton 
Hospital case, the National Audit Office drew attention to the benefits of holding a further 
competition where the successful bidder subsequently reduces its offer or the market 
circumstances are uncertain (NAO 1999).  When asked the question, “If the preferred bidder 
sought to renegotiate the terms of the sale, what did the authority do”, 43% of respondents 
answered ‘negotiate with the preferred bidder’, 27% answered ‘negotiate with more than one 
bidder’ and 30% answered ‘repeat the competition’ (Figure 5.). 
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Figure 5: In your authority over the past three years, if the preferred bidder sought to 
renegotiate the terms of the sale, what did the authority do? 
Negotiate 
with more 
than one 
bidder
27%
Repeat the 
competition
30%
Negotiate 
with 
preferred 
bidder
43%
 
 
Satisfactory completion of the work 
The vendor will normally retain absolute discretion over whether the works have been completed to 
its satisfaction.  The site will not be conveyed or leased until it is satisfied though there may be a 
provision for mediation or arbitration.  In addition, there may be a timetable with other target dates 
that have to be met. 
Development competitions, strengths and weaknesses 
Respondents to the survey were asked, “In your personal opinion, do development competitions 
tend to result in the following?”  The answers to this series of questions are illustrated in Figure 6.  
Development competitions, as opposed to sales by informal tender, are established so as to 
include design issues in the decision making process.  When asked about ‘best design solution’ 
58% of respondents answered either ‘agree’ or ‘strongly agree’ against only 15% who answered 
‘disagree’.  This indicates that competitions achieve the desired result of improving design.  An 
associated reason why competitions are set up is to achieve more detailed than normal control 
over the planning aspects of the project.  When asked about ‘more precise planning requirements’, 
56% were in agreement as opposed to 21% who disagreed.  This indicates that when a 
competition is held, developers face more restrictive planning controls than normal.  Where design 
is included in the decision it could be argued that developers have to spend more and can thus 
afford to pay less for the site.  When asked about ‘maximum sale price’, 50% of respondents 
agreed as against 43% who disagreed.  Reasons for disagreement could be a belief that good 
design costs no more or that a competition fosters innovation that leads to increased value.  One 
expert interviewee felt that developers in competition put in more effort, which reduced contingency 
sums and increased bids.  The aspect of development competitions that was least admired by 
respondents was speed.  When asked about ‘speed of disposal and development’, 69% answered 
either ‘disagree’ or ‘strongly disagree’.  This may be linked to other answers about the problems 
that occur after the appointment of a preferred developer (Figures 2, 3 & 4).  Most interviewees felt 
that competitions take more time and should not be adopted on less significant sites or where time 
is a high priority.  For this reason, apparent slowness may in fact reflect the intrinsic complexity of 
the site.  Interviewees agreed that, when a competition is adopted, expected speed of delivery 
should be explicitly scored in the evaluation.  51% of respondents disagreed that competitions 
resulted in ‘full agreement between Local Authority officers’ compared to only 20% who agreed.  
This probably reflects the difficulty of reconciling design and price issues when choosing a 
preferred developer.  Respondents were evenly split over the question ‘best overall disposal 
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method’ with 41% in agreement and 37% disagreement.  Most of the consultant interviewees felt 
that a competition was a tool that could be fine-tuned to produce the combination of price and 
design desired by the vendor.  However, competitions are not simple and they can be 
misconceived or mismanaged.  
 
Figure 6: Development Competitions tend to result in (percentages) 
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Regeneration, compulsory purchase and competitions 
UK urban policy is directed towards the sustainable reuse of brownfield land and redevelopment at 
higher densities avoiding urban expansion (DCLG 2006).  Brownfield sites are often owned by 
public authorities, which tend to instigate development competitions.  In cities and regions where 
there is a shortage of brownfield land, more redevelopment will be needed to cater for property 
demand stemming from household and economic growth.  Since urban land is often divided into 
small ownership plots, the private sector finds it difficult to assemble the large sites it needs for 
economic redevelopment (Golland 2003 p6).  The powers of compulsory purchase to achieve 
comprehensive site assembly rest with the public sector.  These powers are different for 
authorities, agencies and circumstances and that some require planning permission in advance. 
Local Authorities have recently been encouraged to adopt compulsory purchase more often.  
 
Used properly CPOs can contribute towards effective and efficient urban regeneration, the 
revitalization of communities, and the promotion of business leading to improvements in quality of 
life. Bodies possessing compulsory purchase powers whether at local, regional or national level 
are therefore encouraged to consider using them pro-actively wherever appropriate to ensure real 
gains are brought to residents and the business community without delay (ODPM 2003c). 
 
In order to have a compulsory purchase order (CPO) confirmed the public agency may have to 
prove that it has the resources to carry out the development.  In such circumstances, it may need 
to appoint a preferred developer before a public inquiry to show its partner has the required funds 
and is committed.  For these reasons, most of the consultants interviewed felt that the number of 
development competitions is likely to rise in the next few years. 
Conclusion 
A development competition is a voluntary process that should in theory be able to reconcile the 
needs of both parties. However, despite the rhetoric surrounding public-private partnerships, this 
research has demonstrated that development competitions often hit problems in practice. In 
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particular, too many developments encounter delays and disputes between the appointment of a 
preferred developer and the start of construction. Some of these may be the result of inexperience 
on the part of small authorities which are unused to the process and do not seek expert advice. 
Other problems may be due to the complex nature of the site and the planning context, rather than 
the method of disposal. However, despite the difficulties outlined in this paper, public authorities 
continue to opt for competitions, especially in complex town centre or regeneration situations. 
Competitions have been held since at least the 1970s and are likely to continue. 
 
Public authority vendors have two aims that must be balanced, firstly to achieve best consideration 
and secondly to achieve a redevelopment according that best meets planning and other policy 
aims. For some public sector vendors price will be paramount with the control of redevelopment left 
to the local planning authority; however, regeneration agencies and local authorities have specific 
duties concerning the optimum redevelopment outcome for the site. Land is a precious commodity 
and public authorities find it hard to relinquish control. Land disposal has thus recently become 
associated with advancing policy agendas such as prefabricated housing, affordable housing and 
sustainable development (English Partnerships 2005b). Our results point to differing priorities and 
unresolved tensions between the professional planners, valuers and other officers involved. It is 
important to ensure that a unified approach is presented by the brief and that this does not unravel 
during the evaluation and negotiation stages.  
 
All private property developers seek profit and need to buy sites. Though they often complain of 
the ‘red tape’ associated with competitions, most developers are prepared to bid. Housing 
developers, who need a continuous supply of fresh sites, tend to engage with competitions. 
Commercial developers, who buy less frequently, may be motivated by the challenge and 
profitability of complex longer-term projects. The developer will normally employ a professional 
team that is used to working together in its interests. In the post-appointment phase a developer 
will seek to negotiate advantages over the terms of the Development Agreement and planning 
permission. This may be characterised as seeking to win back profitability sacrificed in competition 
to win appointment. 
 
Where the brief places heavy emphasis on environmental or regeneration benefits, developers will 
reduce their bids to maintain their required profit margin relative to the risks they perceive. The 
vendor authority will therefore pay for these benefits indirectly and the losers will be either 
taxpayers or recipients of public services. Those preparing the brief should therefore ask what is 
special about this particular site that requires enhanced design control or benefits beyond the level 
normally delivered by the planning and planning obligation processes. 
 
A development competition involves a partnership between the authority and the developer and 
trust should be established before the appointment. Once in place, the Development Agreement 
will contain mechanisms for managing the relationship to avoid problems and resolve any disputes 
quickly. A dispute arising over, for example, changes required to secure a pre-letting can be 
referred to mediation or arbitration. However, most problematic delays occur before the Agreement 
is signed. The bid documents should therefore include a firm timetable for progress to the 
Agreement and planning permission. The Authority should maintain contact with a reserve 
developer and rules for terminating the appointment should be in place. 
 
This research has revealed some guidelines for good practice by vendor authorities. Development 
competitions should be reserved for sites whose value or other significance warrants the 
expenditure of time and resources. For such sites a development brief must be carefully prepared 
including, for example, site surveys and heads of terms for the development agreement. The brief 
and the short-listing process should present an opportunity that the market perceives as 
commercially viable. To protect the Authority, the financial terms should include reasonable 
provision for ‘overage’ and ‘clawback’. The evaluation criteria, which should be made available, 
should be capable of being scored objectively yet permit creative alternative interpretations. 
Attention should be paid to the financial and other ability of bidders and their consultants to deliver 
the project. Feedback should be given to all bidders to ensure transparency. A timetable should be 
set out for the period between the appointment decision and the signing of the agreement with 
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clear rules governing a switch to a reserve developer. The authority should be consistent 
throughout, particularly between the planning brief and the treatment of the planning application.  
 
While there have been official enquiries into particular schemes and some public agencies have 
their own internal rules, there is no national published guidance on how to conduct a development 
competition.  Published guidance does exist on related and overlapping matters, for example, on 
planning briefs (ODPM 1998), master plans (CABE 2004) and economic appraisal (HM Treasury 
2005). More extensive research should be conducted, involving all stakeholders, which should lead 
to the publication of specific official guidance on best practice for development competitions. This 
would provide direct help to authorities and give more confidence to developers leading to more 
bids, higher values and improved projects. 
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Endnotes 
                                                
i This paper covers England only since the legal and governmental context to public sector land and planning 
is different in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. 
ii ‘Development competition’ is a phrase that describes a set of procedures that are widespread in England 
and Wales. However, it is not officially defined or exclusively used in practice and has been adopted and 
defined for the purposes of this project. 
iii English Partnerships is a public sector urban regeneration agency which is funded by and reports to the 
national government www.englishpartnerships.gov.uk  
iv Regional Development Agencies are public sector bodies charged with promoting sustainable economic 
development throughout England and reducing regional disparities. RDAs were established in 1999 for nine 
English regions covering the whole country. They report to and are funded by national government 
www.englandsrdas.com  
v ‘A sale by Private Treaty’ in English law describes a sale of property negotiated privately between a seller 
and purchaser. 
vi When selling land by a ‘formal tender’ the seller asks potential purchasers to submit binding bids in writing 
by a set date. 
vii See note two concerning the use of the term ‘development competition’. 
viii The use of the word ‘clawback’ in these circumstances seems incorrect since in fact no grant has been 
made. 
ix For example, the redevelopment of the former town hall on the island site between Cloth Market and Bigg 
Market in Newcastle upon Tyne UK. 
x National town planning guidance in England is revised periodically in the form of Planning Policy 
Statements which must be reflected in the Development Plans produced by Local Authorities. They may also 
be relevant to individual planning applications or appeals (Department for Communities and Local 
Government 2006). 
xi A ‘planning obligation’ under S106 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 is either an agreement 
made between a Local Planning Authority and a property developer or a unilateral undertaking by the 
developer. Under such an obligation the developer agrees to restrictions or payments, related to the project, 
which could not legally be imposed as conditions attached to a planning permission (ODPM 2005). 
